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With good reason, political psychologists might be paranoid to relate paranoia to political leadership. 
First, the very concept, like other hypothetical constructs, may not have valid ontological status, being 
merely something perceived as useful to derive meaning from the world and as if it were a human trait 
or process--human traits and processes being still other hypothetical constructs. Second, it may be a 
vehicle to reinforce, fragment, or avoid interpersonal relationships, depending on the degree of shared 
consensus over criteria for its denotative and connotative meanings and over conventions for its social 
usage. Third, it is heavily but not necessarily linked to psychodynamic theories, postulates of the 
unconscious, and the defense mechanism of projection. These last all have their own ontological 
problems and still elicit bemusement and incredulousness among many adherents of other schools of 
psychology, e.g., the cognitive and behaviorist.  
 
Yet the concept of paranoia continues to be employed by politicians and their analysts (pace, political) 
as well as by mental health professionals. For example, Aleksa Djilas in bemoaning the political fate of 
his father, Milovan Djilas, the great Serbian military, political, intellectual, and moral leader, has stated, 
"We are cursed with this terrible megalomania--and paranoia that in the end is the same illness. When 
people think they have an extraordinary mission in life, then they also believe that everyone is pursuing 
them." (See Hedges (1997.)) The problem with employment of paranoia to formal political leaders as 
opposed to most of the rest of us who are lay politicians is that what goes with the territory of the 
former largely obviates illustrations of paranoia's nonadaptiveness.  
 
How so? From the various editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the 
American Psychiatric Association and the International Classification of Diseases, paranoia seems to 
comprise having a (1) pervasive and unwarranted tendency to interpret the actions of people as 
deliberately demeaning, threatening, or malevolent; (2) general expectation of being exploited or 
harmed by others; (3) penchant to question without justification the loyalty or trustworthiness of 
friends or associates; (4) hypervigilance for taking precautions against any perceived threat; (5) trait 
constellation of being guarded, secretive, devious, and scheming; (6) history of transient ideas of 
reference, e.g., that others are taking special notice of them, or saying vulgar things about them; and (7) 
in more severe cases, false social belief that is resistant to change from disconfirming information.  
 
And now to the politician's world. (1) Certainly there are threatening, demeaning, and malevolent 
people out there. What is the accurate base rate from which political psychologists can estimate 
whether one will have the lowest combination of false positive and false negative errors by viewing all 
people in this manner? (2) Politics is all about variants of conflict management. And towards this 
conflict, one can make a strong case that most politicians believe in the zero sum game nature of the 
world. (If their belief is considered a paranoid delusion, the same judgment would apply to the many 
social scientists who use variants of game theory to explicate social life and to further their careers 
through such explication.) Therefore, one must seek to exploit or harm and expect the same from 
others, much like investing one's capital to ward off ineluctable loss in a world of high inflation. (3) 
Questioning the loyalty and trustworthiness of friends and associates as nonadaptive? Wouldn't it seem 
more bizarre to assume that others are placing your needs above their own? Yes, some people vouch to 
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place other needs before their own in the service of God. But if one has to therefore assume one is 
either God or that one's needs and God's needs are congruent to rest easy about the motivations of 
others, then we have indeed arrived at the megalomaniac delusions--if not the paranoia--referred to by 
Djilas. Anticipating the designs of Brutus may be healthier than anticipating those of Judas. (4) Much as 
total dedication to the service of one's country may not be a vice, hypervigilance in an environment of 
ongoing real and potential crisis may not be paranoid. (It may, however, be less than the most efficient 
and effective style of crisis management.) (5) Being guarded, secretive, devious, and scheming in a world 
of instantaneous information transmission, sophisticated surveillance, and evermore complex 
encryption and counterencryption activities seems to be especially adaptive. It is becoming more and 
more difficult to develop comical examples of paranoid delusions as their content becomes more and 
more likely. (6) In a world where people are blaming their leaders for anything from the weather to the 
loss in competition of a sports team, and there is literally constant plotting to seize and protect power, 
does an idea of reference even remain meaningful in the political sphere? (7) And how to differentiate a 
false social belief from the biases--racial and otherwise--that are characteristic of most people?  
 
To counter the above, one might state that the paranoid leader is one whose mental and behavioral life 
leads to personal and national tragedy. But given that such tragedy occurs often enough for many 
nonparanoid leaders, how does one establish the singular nonadaptiveness of paranoia--or even any 
causal linkage?  
 
These comments apply in varying degrees to all of us, and it is the special situation of the formal political 
leader that renders the concept of paranoia especially problematic as an explanatory or causal variable. 
(See Author. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Washington, D.C.: American 
Psychiatric Association; Begelman, D. A. (1991.) Virtual reality and virtual mistakes: A comment on Tart. 
Dissociation: Progress in the Dissociative Disorders, 4, 214-215; Birt, R. (1993.) Personality and foreign 
policy: The case of Stalin. Political Psychology, 14, 607-625; Harper, D.J. (1996.) Deconstructing 
"paranoia": Towards a discursive understanding of apparently unwarranted suspicion. Theory and 
Psychology, 6, 423-448; Hedges, C. (January 19, 1997.) Critic of Tito is scorned by a new class of Serbs. 
The New York Times. p. 6Y.) (Keywords: Leadership, paranoia) 
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